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Reasoning through Crisis: Crisis,
Incommensurability and Belief
La raison permet-elle de penser la crise ? Crise, incommensurabilité et croyance
James Connelly
 
Introduction
1 This paper draws on Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,1 but it is neither
an exposition nor a critique of that book. Rather it uses certain key concepts from it as a
springboard for some reflections of my own concerning the nature of crisis. Kuhn started
out  as  a  physicist  who  only  later  became  an  historian  and  philosopher  of  his  own
discipline upon being triggered by the recognition that scientists had typically failed to
understand their  own history,  in  particular  the  nature  of  the  progression  from one
significant event to another. Kuhn was not entirely alone in seeing the need for a revision
of the history of the natural sciences. Herbert Butterfield, for instance, who wrote on the
history  of  science  and  also  memorably  on  the  Whig  interpretation  of  history  drew
attention to ‘the tendency in many historians to write on the side of Protestants and
Whigs, to praise revolutions provided they have been successful, to emphasize certain
principles of progress in the past and to produce a story which is the ratification if not
the glorification of the present.’2 And R.G. Collingwood, writing in the mid to late 1930s
made very much the same points as Kuhn in his theory of metaphysics as the science of
uncovering absolute presuppositions and his analysis of change and progress in science
and other disciplines.3 
2 The key term that Kuhn employed – rich in ambiguity – was, of course, paradigm; but for
my present purposes the focus will be equally on the inextricably intertwined concepts of
normal and revolutionary science, and one of the concepts central to the latter: crisis. My
comments  consider  whether  crisis  necessarily  constitutes  a  break  in  continuity  or
practice,  together  with  our  understanding  of  that  practice,  thereby  generating  an
inability to ‘think through’  crisis  (the radical  rupture  thesis),  or  whether crisis  can be
conceived in an evolutionary fashion as a dialectical progression in which tensions and
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oppositions do not necessarily signify (or result in) a breakdown of the system or our
understanding  of  it  (the  dialectical  thesis).  One  of  the  underlying  questions  to  be
considered is precisely how far the analogy between natural science and politics is valid.
Here my purpose is primarily to explore the issue and to raise questions rather than to
provide concrete answers.
 
Crisis and Progress
3 The Kuhnian schema,  extended to  include politics,  can be  summarized thus:  Normal
science or politics exists within a paradigm; emergent tensions and anomalies lead to
crisis in that paradigm; this leads to a period of revolutionary science or politics; there is
a resolution of crisis; there is a reversion to normal science or politics; until the next
time….
4 It  is  clear  that  in  Kuhn’s  characterisation,  crisis  is  counterposed  to  a  conception  of
progress or expected historical continuity. At the minimum this will be constituted by a
sense of discontinuity in what would otherwise have been (or expected to have been) the
case.  At  maximum  it  will  be  constituted  by  the  sense  of  a  break  or  threat  to  the
continuation of a tradition or established set of practices.
5 Crisis is often thought of as simply equivalent to catastrophe, but such a conception not
only deviates from the root meanings and associations of the word, but also leads us away
from its relationship with progress in science or politics. Not only should we ask whether
crisis can lead to progress, but we should also ask whether crisis is a necessary part of
progress.  If  the  latter  claim is  true,  it  contradicts  the  view of  smooth continuity  in
progress and development. Progress and development on this view presuppose, as part of
continuity, threats to continuity in the form of internal strains leading to crises leading to
resolution leading to progress. Progress, in other words, is not identical with smooth
development. As Collingwood remarked,
The dynamics of history is not yet completely understood when it is grasped that
each phase is converted into the next by a process of change. The relation between
phase and process  is  more intimate than that.  One phase changes into another
because the first phase was in unstable equilibrium and had in itself the seeds of
change, and indeed of that change. Its fabric was not at rest; it was always under
strain.4 
6 Progress and development, then, occur not in spite of strains and crises but through them
and, I shall argue, because of them. But it needs to be inquired how we can characterise
the idea of progress itself. Surely, it might be suggested, if we are to speak intelligibly of
progress  we  have  to  presuppose  some  conception  of  the  end  towards  which  that
development is tending and against which we can measure the pace and rate of progress?
Does progress, that is, necessarily presuppose (implicitly or explicitly) a telos? In science
the telos is  typically held to be one of  more complete explanatory power:  this  is,  in
principle,  possible  to determine,  and it  serves  as  a  regulative ideal  for  the scientific
endeavour.5 For politics, a telos is much more problematic. If there is a telos in history
then politics, as an activity taking place historically, is included somehow in that telos.
The key question is what is meant by such a telos in history – is it something akin to
historical determinism or something more innocuous and less deterministic? Another
meaning of telos would be an ideal which is not in the process of being deterministically
realised, but which is understood as the inevitable goal of an activity. In science – or at
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least in some of the branches of the sciences – it is intelligible to set as a goal the ideal of
a complete explanatory system and to regard anything short of this as a sign of the, as
yet, defective incomplete nature of the science, and the effort to attain this as its ideal.
But in politics such an ideal – the ideal of a complete system of interlocking societal goals
analogous  to  the  ideal  of  a  complete  explanatory  scheme  in  science  –  is  either
unintelligible or could only be made intelligible through force, imposition, oppression
and control.  The  idea  of  a  completely  intelligible  political  world  or  of  a  completely
controllable political world are both forms of telos. The claims made in the one are bound
up with those made in the other:  the latter  presupposes the former and the former
encourages the latter which lives by the myth of complete intelligibility, striving to make
reality fit its imposed pattern, by force if necessary rather than admit that the myth was
indeed a myth.
 
Normal politics vs revolutionary politics
7 Assume,  for the sake of  argument,  that  Kuhn is  broadly correct  about the nature of
normal  and  revolutionary  science;  can  we  reasonably  suppose  that  there  can  be  a
‘normal’  politics  akin  to  ‘normal’  science?  And  a  ‘revolutionary’  politics  akin  to
‘revolutionary’ science? The notion of normal science implies relative stasis at a given
point,  a  broad  agreement  on  fundamentals  of  inquiry,  on  a  constellation  of  agreed
presuppositions and working practices. Kuhn states that ‘Though intrinsic value is no
criterion for a puzzle, the assured existence of a solution is’ and that ‘One of the things a
scientific community acquires with a paradigm is a criterion for choosing problems that,
while the paradigm is taken for granted, can be assumed to have solutions.’6 We might
wish  to  revise  this  view  to  some  extent  by  arguing,  as  Collingwood  did,  that  the
appearance of stasis is illusory, an illusion produced by the snapshot of the moment, and
that beneath the surface there will always be tensions, strain and incoherence.7 However,
this does not undermine Kuhn’s point, which is that, at a given time or period, and not
only for heuristic purposes, but in scientific practice itself, there is sufficient overlapping
agreement  on  a sufficient  number  of  fundamentals  for  us  to  talk  intelligibly  of  the
contrast between normal science so conceived and revolutionary science (in which these
characteristics are absent). Further, he would agree with Collingwood that science can
and will exhibit strains and tensions as its explanatory fabric proves inadequate to what
is required of it, and hence it enters a pre-revolutionary stage of crisis. Everything moves,
but not at an equal pace; and there is a valid contrast to be drawn between science in its
different phases – not all phases are alike. 
8 Our primary concern, however, is not with science, but with politics and civilisation. We
might accept that a Kuhnian account works for science: but is it an appropriate way of
characterising politics?  My answer  is  in  the affirmative.  Yes:  there  can be  a  normal
politics or ‘politics as usual:’ but what is politics as usual or ‘normal’ politics?8 ‘Politics as
usual’,  in  the  environmental  context,  for  example,  refers  to  a  deeply  entrenched
approach  to  the  economy,  economic  growth,  and  economic  and  political  interests,
together with scepticism concerning environmental policy, especially where it is felt to
be a brake on growth.9 This form of politics does not necessarily imply active hostility to
the  environment,  but  it  does  imply  relative  indifference  and  the  relegation  of  the
environment to a secondary concern. The structure of ‘politics as usual’ comprises an
overlapping  set  of  deep  presuppositions  with  a  lexical  ordering  between  levels  of
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presuppositions and commitments, the structuring effects of power and influence, and
the limits of bureaucratic rationality. On this view, the actions of government are an
expression  of  underlying  structures  of  power  and  influence,  basic  beliefs  and
administrative stasis. Mid-way between observable action and deep presuppositions lie
approaches to tactics  and strategy,  manipulation and structuring of  choices,  and the
shaping of the political opportunity structure. 
9 Power  is  obviously  important: at  the  deepest  level  lies  the  power  of  action-guiding
presuppositions which are unquestioned and rarely challenged. At the next level there is
the ability to shape and manipulate public debate through reputational power, or the
implicit  threat arising from the belief  that political  actors can access other forms of
power if they wish. Finally, there is explicit observable power. Power operates on all these
dimensions:  they are not mutually exclusive but overlap,  and differ in efficiency. For
instance, it is more efficient to employ reputational power to manipulate the political
agenda than to rely on explicit threats or physical force; and where the political agenda is
founded on deep presuppositions ensuring prior agreement on fundamental ends, that is
more efficient still.10 
10 Thus a political actor can rely on reputation and implicit threat to achieve success in
agenda  manipulation.  This  is  supplemented  by  the  underlying  constellation  of
presuppositions which absolves them of the need to argue their case explicitly because it
is always already the default position. Only challengers to the status quo have to seriously
argue  their  case,  whereas  its  defenders  are  rarely  required  to  provide  more  than  a
minimal  level  of  argument.  On  this  view,  therefore,  defenders  of  the  political  and
economic status quo possess an inbuilt advantage either because no one questions the
desirability of economic growth (as an end), or of roads, planes, trade and industry (as
means); or, if these are questioned, the ensuing questioning is at best superficial. In this
world, to be real is to be measurable; whatever is not measurable is not real; and the
approved  medium of  measurement  is  GDP.  In  such  ‘debates’  a  conclusion  is  swiftly
reached that, although hypothetical cases might exist where economic considerations are
not paramount, in practice unlimited economic growth is an unqualified good. At this
point all that then remains of policy debate is discussion of means, location or timing:
when or where, rather than whether; more or less (rather than not at all); and hence
opportunities for manipulation of decisions through the cunning use of pre-constrained
choices open up nicely for policy makers wedded to the status quo.
11 ‘Politics  as  usual’,  then,  concerns  a  set  of  presuppositions  within  which  deep
presuppositions (taken for granted in political/economic argument) can be distinguished
from  surface  presuppositions  (relatively  open  to  question).  Surface  presuppositions
typically concern means not ends; deep presuppositions tend to concern ends, not means.
Relations between these presuppositions are governed by a ‘lexical’ ordering in which
certain conditions having to be satisfied before others can come into play. For ‘politics as
usual’, once the conditions for ensuring economic growth are satisfied, environmental
considerations  can  be  considered,  but  not  vice  versa.  Therefore,  if  environmental
protection is at the expense of economic growth it should not be pursued; if it promotes
economic growth it should be pursued; if it has no palpable effect on economic growth it
might be pursued if desired. 
12 Debates surrounding climate change, energy, rail, roads and aviation policy take place
within this framework, where two of the presuppositions of ‘politics as usual’ are the
desirability of economic growth and belief that the relationship between environment
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and economy is typically a zero sum trade-off. The second presupposition is slightly more
subtle than this, in that environment and economy are not necessarily assumed to clash,
but where they do (and they usually will), the economy should be prioritised. Both might
co-exist in a green economy pursuing sustainable green development, but the implicit
proviso is that this so only while there is no opposition between them. It is revealing that
‘green growth’, the ‘green economy’ and so on are typically promoted not as green qua
green, but as good for the economy: again, environmental values are subordinated to
economic values. And economic values are assumed to be ends in themselves, predicated
on a perception of ‘the economy’ as an exogenous reified entity, as distinct from any
sense that the economy thus conceived is merely an abstraction from the multitudinous
actions and transactions constituting distinct  but  inseparable  parts  of  the totality  of
activities in a society.
13 ‘Policy  making  as  usual’  tends  to  be  conducted  incrementally.  Incrementalism  both
describes  how  things  happen  and  prescribes  a  model  for  rational  decision  making.
Environmental issues, although their salience in public and political consciousness varies,
have over time built up an institutionalised footing. They have become institutionally
embedded, with the consequence that they operate within the bounds of the structural
presuppositions  of  bureaucracies.  Institutionalisation –  the  existence of  agencies  and
departments – possesses the clear advantage of providing a ready-made structure within
which policy responses can be channelled. However, along with inherited techniques for
dealing with issues, problems tend to be defined in ways which only allow solutions that
accord  with  prevailing  political  and  administrative  arrangements.  The  advantage  of
institutionalisation is  at  the same time its  disadvantage because of  the limits  of  the
‘administrative mind’ in which policy makers typically pay attention only to problems
open  to  technological  and  administrative  solutions.11 ‘Rational’  administration
presupposes a view of progress within which some approaches are regarded as reasonable
and others are not: within this frame, responses to environmental problems are often
piecemeal, because taking a holistic view would challenge presupposed views of economic
and industrial development. Any form of serious or radical environmentalism challenges
this because it implies that the presupposed notions of ‘development’ and ‘progress’ may
in themselves be the problem. As a result, problems cannot readily be admitted to be
systemic crises but rather have to be presented as a series of manageable, soluble and
more  or  less  separable  problems  packaged  in  ways  which  match  the  ‘functional
differentiation of the administrative apparatus.’12 Doubtless there is something to be said
for reframing problems to admit of practicable solutions: it would be absurd to dismiss
the  importance  of  incrementalism,  bounded  rationality,  and  the  constraints  of  the
administrative mind. But taking environmentalism seriously presents a serious challenge
to those limits and the presuppositions which sustain them.13
14 Normal politics on this view is like normal science. But assumptions can be powerful
without being true – and that might be the case here. There might be no solution within
normal politics; all we might have is the reassuring belief that there is a solution, thereby
masking the deeper need for political change.
 
Crisis in hope, expectations, legitimacy 
15 One of the characteristics of political crisis is a crisis in hope. In such a crisis, hope might
be lost or it might become irrationally all-embracing: because we hope for nothing we
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hope for everything – a deus ex machina; and because we hope for everything, we are in
fact hoping for nothing concrete in particular. In a crisis expectations become uncertain
because we no longer know which cause produces which effect: the controls, buttons and
levers are all in a different place and we don’t know what, if anything, any of them does
anymore. 
16 Normal politics (politics as usual) is based on tacit premises and unarticulated practices;
rules (both constitutive and regulative); the ability to recognise the present through its
aetiology, its ‘’how it came to be.’ The obvious contrast is revolutionary politics, with its
attendant characteristics: the absence of rules, a loss of tacit understanding, the inability
to recognise the present through understanding how it came to be. There is a parallel
here, in our ability (or its absence) to read the present in the tests conducted on chess
grandmasters which that they can remember any chess configuration shown to them,
often with the briefest of glances, but, only if the position they are shown is the outcome
of a possible sequence of real, rational chess moves. Where they are asked to remember
chess configurations which are random, that is, lacking an intelligible history, they are
typically unable to do so.
17 Kuhn observes that when confronted by even ‘severe and prolonged anomalies’, although
scientists ‘may begin to lose faith and then to consider alternatives, they do not renounce
the paradigm that has led them into crisis’. He continues by observing that ‘once it has
achieved the status of paradigm, a scientific theory is declared invalid only if an alternate
candidate is available to take its place’.14
18 The point about crisis is that there needs to be a resolution. But on the other hand, the
point  about  crisis  as  experienced is  that  we can’t  be  sure there is,  can or  will  be  a
resolution. There is a crucial problem of not knowing whether the crisis will or can be
resolved.  Kuhn’s  point  is  that  it  can  only  be  resolved  when an  alternative  becomes
available, but whether such an alternative will emerge is, in principle, a moot point. Crisis
could, therefore, in such a case be permanent. A resolution does not have to be a violent
revolution in the sense in which this is used in revolutionary politics. Another way of
phrasing this is to say that there can be a dialectical resolution. But the challenge is that
of  having  to  call  across  the  chasm.  This  we  have  to  do  where  there  are  issues  of
incommensurability and incompatibility and its difficulty depends on how radical these
issues are.  A related point  is  that  we need to ask whether crises  within or  between
paradigms are the same as crisis of the tradition or historical continuity itself.
19 Directly linked to this point is the relation between criticism and crisis. The two stand
and fall together, but in what way? In a crisis critical thought is required and thought is
critical. But what of the notion of something as critical? Is this the same as its being
important? And this raises again our opening question of whether it is possible rationally
think one’s way through a crisis, or whether this possibility is precluded by the nature of
crisis itself.  The meta problem here is that in times of crisis there might be no rules
governing critical thinking or criticism; and this might be taken to imply that imply that
therefore  critical  thinking  itself  becomes  impossible.  A  related  question  is  whether
criticism itself  is  borne of  crisis,  and only applicable  in crisis,  or  whether  it  is  only
possible in normal circumstances. This would lead to the paradox that while it is only
possible  under  normal  circumstances,  it  is  especially  required  in  revolutionary
circumstances. That would be an intriguing and vicious irony.
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Leadership and legitimacy
20 Normal politics requires humdrum, not heroic leadership. It revolves about expertise and
experts and the workings of the administrative mind. Crisis, on the other hand, perhaps
requires Schmittian leadership, if we may dare call it that. By Schmittian I mean the need
for  leadership  in  circumstances  in  which  ‘normal’  politics  has  broken  down,
circumstances in which agreement is elusive or impossible because of the absence of
shared presuppositions and hence a situation in which the sovereign determines meaning
in the absence of an authoritative cognitively grounded statement of meaning, and in
which the sign of the sovereign is lies precisely in the ability to do so. The point about
Schmitt’s view is that he directly addresses the idea of crisis and insists that in a crisis the
very grounds of reasoning are absent and the only way of cutting through to re-establish
a  new normality  is  for  the  sovereign  to  decide,  a  decision  necessarily  grounded  on
nothing other than the sovereignty of the sovereignty. ‘For a legal order to make sense, a
normal  situation must  exist,  and he is  sovereign who definitely decides whether the
normal situation actually exists.’15 
21 Maybe, of course, we do not need to go so far. Whether one takes Schmitt’s decisionistic
account of sovereignty and the exception literally or figuratively, one can take from it the
idea that it describes a politicised version of Kuhn’s account of science in crisis. And what
is the way out of crisis? We answer ‘leadership’, and when asked for clarification we say
we seek ‘cognitive leadership’: the way out of crisis, if there is one, is through cognitive
leadership.  What  is  cognitive  leadership?  It  is  the  ability  to  conceptualise  and
reconceptualise problems in such a way as to establish new ways of configuring discipline
or reshaping a politics. In politics it includes the ability to frame power and interests in
such a way as to show interested parties that where they might previously have appeared
to be opposed, in fact they are not. Such an ability, should anyone possess it, is clearly
important and possibly necessary in a crisis. It should be noted that what is suggested
here is not the promotion of sophistry or propaganda, but rather the ability to rethinking
the framing of issues and problems in such a way that those subject to them are able to
escape their frame. It is a form of escape that is being offered, an escape from the picture
which ‘held us captive’. Wittgenstein’s comment, in full, is that ‘A picture held us captive.
And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat
it to us inexorably’.16 Where incommensurability and incompatibility are profound there
are limits to conceptualisation as the bases for conceptualisation are themselves in doubt.
To misappropriate Schmitt’s account of the sovereign: cognitive leader is he or she who
can decide on the reconceptualisation.
 
A Masked Crisis?
22 If one walks in some part of Britain (near Hadrian’s Wall for example) you can, on a
summer day, clearly see not Roman roadways as such but tangible evidence of their path.
Why are they visible only in the summer? Because they traverse what have been wheat
fields for centuries and can only be seen when the wheat is ripening, when the wheat
along the line of the paths is visibly shorter and flimsier than that surrounding it. The
reason is that centuries ago the soil was repeatedly and heavily compacted by traffic, and,
despite  the  intervening  length  of  time,  this  affects  crop  growth  today.  One  might
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compare this with the situation at the end of the First World War when the victors (as
personified for example by Sir Mark Sykes, François Georges-Picot and Gertrude Bell)17
carved up the Middle East to their own purposes. Without claiming that all of the ills of
the present Middle East can be attributed to these often arbitrary boundary divisions
(which would be an illegitimate piece of historical determinism) there is no doubt that
the way the boundaries were created left a legacy which is visible in the present, just as
are the lines of the Roman roads. Many say that the troubles of the Middle East can (at
least in part) be attributed to these decisions taken a hundred years ago. Can we say that
there was a masked crisis (or perhaps a suppressed crisis) which emerged only many
decades after it was first thought to have been attended to and dealt with? 
23 In one sense, radical change can be easily brought about. It is apparently easy to carve up
the  post  war  world  and  resolve  longstanding  issues:  or  so  it  seemed.  But  culture,
language,  tradition,  and  political  and  tribal  allegiances  were  only  masked  but  not
removed, and on their re-appearance they returned with a vengeance, with a force in
some senses in direct proportion to the strength of their original denial. These things
were held not to matter, hence they were treated as though they did not matter; but in
the end Britain and other nations were forced to see just how much they had really
mattered all along. The boundary divisions established at the end of the First World War
were, one might say, a success, but a catastrophic success.18
24 This illustration points to the possible existence of a masked or suppressed crisis. But
how do we characterise this? Is it a delayed crisis, a postponed crisis or a crisis that was
always present although subterraneously? Is it a crisis that can be resolved and, if so, on
what terms? There obviously cannot be a return to the status quo ex ante and neither can a
remedy be found in a fresh round of neat boundary changes, the misplace belief in which
was the essence of the problem in the first place. In social and political affairs going back
to the past from the present is never really possible as the present always contains traces
of the past incapsulated in itself. To coin a complicated phrase: a present which is what it
is because it has reverted to a previous state of affairs is different from the original state
of affairs to which it is reverting precisely because it is a reaction to the reaction to that
original state of affairs.19 Hence there is, I suggest, a real possibility that here we have not
only a masked or suppressed crisis, and that such a crisis remains a permanent crisis, its
permanency guaranteed by the very factors which mistakenly led British rulers to believe
(or  affect  to  believe)  that  rationalistic  constructions  of  the  type  that  Oakeshott  so
memorably denounced20 were possible.
25 A masked or suppressed crisis is, then, a crisis which is (or was) not visible, was not a felt
experience at the time of crisis, but nonetheless a real event, a real process, with real
effects which we only discover later, retrospectively attributing them to a crisis invisible
to us at the time. But this is, put like that, misleading: the crisis was felt by some – the
powerless; it was unfelt only by the powerful, or those most distant from the locus of
crisis.
 
Tradition
26 ‘Normal’  politics  or  science  takes  place  against  a  shared  background of  deeply  held
presuppositions constituting both the form and the content, both the substance and the
method,  of  the forms of  inquiry and activity.  Such constellations of  presuppositions,
providing a background of intelligibility within which foreground activities and inquiries
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take  place,  slowly  change  and  are  subject  to  modification.  This  is  a  tradition.  But
traditions, on the Kuhnian account, can lead themselves into crises, which implies that
they can be broken, and that the conditions of intelligibility can be shattered or seriously
injured at least. 
27 How do we understand what it  might mean for a tradition to break? Is such a thing
conceivable? Can there be a crisis in a tradition? Can a tradition collapse? Do crises take
place within a tradition or mark a breakdown between traditions? Kuhn himself seems to
be ambiguous on this point,  arguing that a paradigm is a tradition because it  grants
intelligibility  to the scientific  project  at  any given time.21 He is  here using the term
tradition in a narrow sense, and one which excludes the possibility of radical change. But
is there any reason that radical change over time is excluded within a tradition? And even
where  there  seems  to  be  radical  change,  is  there  not  some sense  in  which  a  wider
background  of  shared  practices  and  mutual  intelligibilities  aka  tradition  remains  in
place?  If  the  former  –  does  this  violate  the  understanding  of  tradition  as  gradual
development within which change takes place intelligibly against a background of shared
but shifting presuppositions which overlap sufficiently for there to be no radical break?
Does the idea of a break within a tradition make sense? Or can there be a break between
traditions? Or should we conceive of traditions as continuing in ways deeper than the
surface disturbances which are so alarming to those experiencing them at the time, as
Oakeshott argues in some moods?22 
28 But if crises mark a break between traditions, does it follow that a) tradition is constantly
born de  novo and b)  that  no meaning,  or  practices  carry over  from one to another?
Logically, to assert the first position stated above, a difference between paradigms and
tradition has to be presupposed. For example, the difference between science per se and a
particular paradigm within science at a given time. Just as anomalies only make sense
against  the  background  of  a  paradigm,  so  a  paradigm  only  makes  sense  against  a
background of science, that is, a particular tradition, per se. one could, of course, ask the
bigger question, which is whether there can conceivably be a super crisis not just of a
paradigm but of science itself? An example of such a claim appears to be that made by
Alasdair MacIntyre in After Virtue, when he propounds his ‘disquieting suggestion’.
29 The hypothesis which I wish to advance is that in the actual world which we inhabit the
language of morality is in the same state of grave disorder as the language of natural
science in the imaginary world which I described. What we possess, if this view is true,
are the fragments of a conceptual scheme, plans which now lack those contexts from
which their significance derived. We possess indeed simulacra of morality, we continue to
use  many  of  the  key  expressions.  But  we  have-very  largely,  if  not  entirely-lost  our
comprehension, both theoretical and practical, of morality.23 
30 Our  problem here  is  that  crises  are  precisely  occasions  on  which  the  conditions  of
intelligibility  breakdown and this  seems to  imply a break in tradition rather  than a
continuity.  One  answer  is  to  distinguish  between  relatively  deeper  and  relatively
shallower presuppositions. It might be for example that a paradigm breaks down, but it
does so against a background of an ongoing scientific tradition of practice and inquiry.
After all, if the rupture were complete then it would be impossible even to identify any
remedy or modification as belonging to the same genus. Everything changes, but not
everything  changes  equally  all  the  time.  Intelligibility  is  never  entirely  lost;  the
conversation  never  fully  disappears.  On  this  view  it  would  appear  that  MacIntyre
overstated his case, and that we know that he overstated it because if it were really true
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the conditions of intelligibility for claiming its truth would be absent and hence his case
could not be intelligibly made. But given that it was intelligibly made, it must follow, on
this view that he overstated it. So perhaps he overstated the position – but this in itself
could be the point: he clearly shows that we still possess fragments of the original moral
tradition and hence he shows, by the same token, that the rupture is not complete. 
31 One way to characterise MacIntyre’s position is through using the concept introduced
earlier – that of a masked crisis: that is, a crisis in which we do not typically appreciate
that there is a crisis at all until circumstances emerge historically in which the crisis is
revealed as having been present all along. This presupposes that a crisis does not have to
be a felt crisis: a real crisis might or might not be a felt crisis and conversely, a crisis
might be falsely felt, in which case there is a crisis not of substance but of confidence –
real in its way, but not structurally or conceptually challenging in the way that the crises
discussed above are.
 
Conclusion
32 In the view stated in this paper, a crisis is in large measure a feature of strains arising
within presuppositions themselves and between those presuppositions and our practices
and consciousness of the foundations of those practices. Just now I asked whether a crisis
can be a crisis if we do not know it to be so? There is a difficulty here: if, as suggested
above, part of being a crisis is that we do not know the outcome, then a crisis has to be a
felt crisis or it is no crisis. However, if the idea of a hidden or masked crisis has anything
to be said for it, there are crises which are not felt crises (or are felt crises only at some
later point, after the crisis has already been doing its subterranean work. But if it has to
be felt as a crisis to be a crisis, this seems to rule out the possibility of a masked crisis. The
distinction is between logical and psychological aspects of a crisis. A felt crisis is one
experienced as a crisis; a masked crisis is one which is not felt (at the time) as a crisis, but
which is nonetheless logically a crisis. Such a crisis will eventually be experienced as a
crisis,  but it  is  still  a genuine crisis  in the logical  sense irrespective of  whether it  is
experienced as such. We have to retain this distinction between experience of crisis and
identification (logically) of a crisis, otherwise a crisis is simply what we experience as a
crisis, and although the perception of a crisis can cause a crisis of sorts (to misappropriate
Roosevelt, crisis lies in the fear of crisis itself) such a crisis is not what Kuhn is discussing,
because it is not rooted in the logical and experimental features of a paradigm and its
structuring presuppositions. In the end I am endorsing the dialectical thesis identified at
the outset, despite temptations to overstate crisis and to render it both unintelligible and
irresolvable.
33 James Connelly moved to the University of Hull in 2006, after having taught at the
University of Southampton and Southampton Solent University. He teaches political
theory,  contemporary  political  philosophy  and  environmental  politics.  He  also
writes on the political philosophy of R.G. Collingwood and other British Idealists, on
the philosophy of history, and on electoral systems and political participation. He
was the Principal Investigator for the Leverhulme funded Military Ethics Education
Network)  MEEN (2009-12,)  and  is  currently  Principal  Investigator  for  the  ESRC
funded project The Common Good: Ethics and Rights in Cybersecurity (ERCS). James
is co-editor of the International Journal of Social Economics, and Collingwood and British
Idealism Studies.
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ABSTRACTS
This paper draws on Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of  Scientific  Revolutions,  but it  is  neither an
exposition nor a critique of that book and uses certain concepts from it as a springboard for
reflections on the nature of crisis. Kuhn’s key term was paradigm; however, the primary focus of
this paper will be on the intertwined concepts of normal and revolutionary science, and one of
the concepts central to the latter: crisis. I ask whether crisis necessarily constitutes a break in
continuity or practice, together with our understanding of that practice, thereby generating an
inability to ‘think through’ crisis (the radical rupture thesis), or whether crisis can be conceived
in an evolutionary fashion as a dialectical progression in which tensions and oppositions do not
necessarily  signify  (or  result  in) a  breakdown of  the system or  our  understanding of  it  (the
dialectical  thesis).  One of  the underlying questions to be considered is  precisely how far the
analogy between natural science and politics is valid. Here my purpose is primarily to explore the
issue and to raise questions rather than to provide concrete answers. 
Cet article prend appui sur l’ouvrage de Thomas Kuhn La structure des révolutions scientifiques. Sans
en proposer une présentation ni une critique, il reprend certains des concepts auquel recourt
l’auteur pour interroger la nature de la crise. Si, chez Kuhn, le « paradigme » constitue un terme-
clé, il s’agira ici en premier lieu d’examiner les concepts, qui se recoupent, de science normale et
de  science  révolutionnaire,  et,  dans  ce  dernier  cas,  celui  de  crise,  qui  lui  est  central.  On  se
demandera si la crise doit se concevoir nécessairement comme rupture d’une continuité et d’une
pratique, ainsi que de la manière même dont nous comprenons cette pratique – ce qui, selon la
thèse de la rupture radicale, nous rendrait incapables penser une résolution de la crise –, ou bien si
elle  doit  être  envisagée  en  termes  d’évolution  et  dans  la  perspective  d’une  progression
dialectique : les tensions et les oppositions ne signifieraient ni n’entraîneraient automatiquement
la fin du système, pas plus que notre manière de l’appréhender (thèse de la dialectique). Parmi les
questions  sous-jacentes  qui  se  posent,  il  conviendra  d’examiner  dans  quelle  mesure  on peut
établir une analogie entre sciences naturelles et politique. On s’efforcera ici avant tout de tenter
de  poser  le  problème  et  de  soulever  des  interrogations  plutôt  que  de  fournir  des  réponses
concrètes.
INDEX
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